Roads to nowhere

Well we know where we're goin'

But we don't know where we've been

And we know what we're knowin'

But we can't say what we've seen

And we're not little children

And we know what we want

And the future is certain

Give us time to work it out

[Chorus:]

We're on a road to nowhere

Come on inside

Takin' that ride to nowhere

We'll take that ride

-- Talking Heads – Road To Nowhere

It's not every day that the esteemed Foreign Policy team delve deep into Guambat's alter-ego procurement world, but they've done it this month, twice:

Ghani, UNDP, and the NYT: Who Really ‘Overreached’ on Paying the Afghan Police? and

Steamrolled: A special investigation into the diplomacy of doing business abroad.

Guambat reckons the latter one, by Matthew Brunwasser, supported by the Investigative Reporting Program at the University of California at Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism, is the juicier one. Here's a few teasers:

To be sure, promoting the business interests of American companies abroad is in the portfolio of every U.S. diplomat. Government officials argue that such efforts benefit the United States economically by creating exports and jobs. But the drive for private profit, critics assert, can conflict with foreign-policy interests, especially when projects cause damage in host countries.

The 48-mile, four-lane Kosovo Highway, as it is known, was completed in November 2013 for roughly $1.3 billion — or about $25 million per mile — according to official government figures given to an international organization in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. It was the most expensive public works project in Kosovo’s modern history, and it is arguably one of the highest-quality roads in the Balkans.

The road stretches through one of the poorest pockets of southeastern Europe. But today, the highway is practically empty, used at less than one-third of its capacity, according to the government’s, according to the government’s own traffic count and information provided by international economic experts. As of 2013, only one in seven Kosovars owned a car, giving the country one of the lowest automobile ownership rates in Europe. The highway’s black vein of asphalt now stands out against the Balkan countryside, as if mocking the surrounding poverty like a cruel Dickensian joke.

A six-month investigation by the Investigative Reporting Program at the University of California at Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism has found that highways in Kosovo, Croatia, Romania, and Albania were boondoggles for the countries in which they were constructed, and that members of governments and international institutions often saw problems coming before Bechtel (along with its Turkish joint venture partner, Enka) even began work on the roads.

U.S. Ambassador Dell is emblematic of a cited by Bechtel’s critics: that its Balkan road projects have blurred the line between U.S. foreign policy and the corporation’s interests. Dell spoke out publicly in support of the highway project, the contract for which was signed in April 2010 — even as international institutions questioned the road’s value to Kosovo. A May 2010 World Bank report, for instance, found that only two out of nine sections of the road (those nearest Pristina) would be “economically viable,” meaning that they could be expected to produce an economic benefit greater than the cost of construction and maintenance. (The findings were based on projections of Kosovo’s economic growth until the year 2032.)

Dell left Pristina in 2012 and took another diplomatic position elsewhere, before retiring from the State Department in October 2013. The following month, Bechtel hired him as its representative in Mozambique.

Founded in 1898, Bechtel is a private company, now in the hands of the fifth generation of the family for whom it is named. The company has long used highly placed officials in the State Department and other government agencies to shepherd international contracts; diplomatic knowledge, experience, and contacts have played vital roles in establishing the corporation as a major player in international construction. There is also a revolving door between Bechtel and the U.S. government, with some former diplomats joining the company and some former Bechtel executives and senior employees taking up public positions in the foreign service and elsewhere.

According to a Bechtel veteran, Balkan governments have chosen the company for projects because of its proven record of delivering quality products on tight deadlines. “The history of infrastructure in the Balkans is fraught with non-performance,” said Charles Redman, a senior vice-president at Bechtel from 1996 to 2008 and a retired career U.S. diplomat. (Among his senior posts, Redman was assistant secretary and State Department spokesman during the term of Secretary George Shultz, who himself was plucked from his position as president of Bechtel by Ronald Reagan. Bechtel’s onetime general counsel, Caspar Weinberger, also served alongside Shultz in Reagan’s cabinet, as secretary of defense.)

After Bechtel submitted its bid for the highway, according to interviews with officials from international institutions, Ambassador Dell put pressure on the Kosovo government not only to choose Bechtel but also to sign a contract with terms that were favorable to the corporation. Meanwhile, according to these sources, a broad coalition including the World Bank, the IMF, European embassies, NGOs, and think tanks opposed Bechtel’s bid — sometimes publicly, sometimes privately. They were concerned that the bidding process and negotiations lacked transparency, and that the proposed project was so lavish that it might damage Kosovo’s economic stability. Of particular concern was the bid’s unit-price contract, which meant the highway project’s final bill would be tallied only when all work had been completed. This left open the possibility that estimated costs could skyrocket.

Sorry, Guambat's attention span ends somewhere about here. Maybe, though, you should read the piece. Guambat's peace of mind is disturbed by such matters.

They treated Africa as if a market when the rest of world viewed Africa as an economic basket case

Apart from creating gold out of alchemy, which is to say valuable assets out of ideas, the great success of American commerce for most of the 20th Century has been in marketing. Now the cricket strikes at the master.

Why Obama is making an African power-play against China

China surpassed the U.S. in total trade in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009, but its increasingly strong economic ties took root in 2000, when then-Chinese president Hu Jintao hosted representatives from 44 African nations in Beijing to establish the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation.

That meeting "set a mandate for China to become Africa's largest trading partner," says Richard Poplak, a Johannesburg-based Canadian author and journalist writing a book about China’s growing role in Africa.

It was also an early sign that the Chinese viewed economic opportunity in Africa through a different lens than their American counterparts.

"What the Chinese did that no one else had done before was that they considered Africa as a market — a market for Chinese goods, institutions and services — when the rest of world viewed Africa as an economic basket case and a place for aid programs,' says Poplak.

While the U.S. focused on global security following the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, Chinese firms began shoring up major contracts throughout the continent that ensured access to Africa's vast resource wealth in exchange for the funding and construction of infrastructure projects like roads, railways and airports.

China also emphasized multilateral agreements with entire regions of sub-Saharan Africa — agreements the U.S. has largely avoided in the past, says Thomas Tieku, an assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. "The U.S., in many senses, miscalculated their approach to Africa. It has always been to focus on bilateral relationships— select a few countries and deal solely with them," says Tieku. "Now they're playing a catch-up game to try to establish equally strong relationships with multilateral institutions like the African Union."

The U.S. will always have to contend with the fact that China is not limited in its economic partnerships by commitments to propping up democracy and freedom, since the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy is to take a non-interventionist approach with its trading partners, says Tieku.

"The Chinese will come into a country and in practical terms it doesn’t matter who is running the country," says Poplak. "It doesn't matter what system of government your country uses, it doesn't matter what you did last week. They will come in and do business." But, says Poplak, the Chinese business is not always “above board or unaccompanied by what the Chinese would call the culture of gift giving, euphemistically, but it certainly respects African agency in a way that the West never, ever has and still doesn't."

"Many African policy makers are just not interested in hearing about the power of the free market any more.”

Interesting that it took a Canadian, not USAmerican, observer to state the obvious.

 


Pay attention to that phrase,"non-interventionist approach". 


To borrow a phrase from Inigo Montoya, "I do not think that word means what you think it does".

US should try Conventional wisdom

The US is sending its traditional military resources to the seas west and northwestward of Guambat's burrow, as a show of strength in the South China Seize, perhaps, or maybe just a way to avoid the monsoon over Guam. 

If the former, the US would have a stronger hand to play if it adopted the wisdom of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, according to Michael Kelly, a Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research & International Programs at Creighton University School of Law:

 China's Blue Water Ambitions and the Law of the Sea, JURIST - Forum, Oct. 4, 2012

Signed in 1982 and in force since 1994, UNCLOS establishes the legal framework for nautical sovereignty claims of coastal states. Such states may claim a 12-nautical-mile band of water immediately offshore as their territorial sea and an additional 200 nautical miles of water as their exclusive economic zone, within which they may assert dominance over natural resource exploration and exploitation. In the South China Sea, this amounts to vast fishing rights and control over oil reserves estimated at 213 billion barrels (larger than Saudi Arabia's reserves).

But within such waters, coastal states must also guarantee freedom of navigation rights for other states.

This basic framework of oceanic sovereignty is an extension of territorial sovereignty. As such, sea claims "run with the land." So in order for China's claims to go forward, it must successfully assert sovereignty over bits of land from which it can draw those lines (The Economist has provided a detailed map of the overlapping sovereignty claims of China, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia in the South China Sea).

Even though the US recognizes many of the UNCLOS provisions as binding custom, it is still the "outsider." As such, it is difficult for the US to force compliance with UNCLOS provisions and impossible to avail itself of dispute resolution features as a party — the threat of which could induce better Chinese cooperation, especially in the case of island claims.

The rest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council belong to UNCLOS, as do the rest of the Arctic Council members, all of the Antarctic claimants, all of the South China Sea claimants and all of the other North Pacific regional powers except North Korea.

Not only will the US not be able to contain China through UNCLOS, as a non-party, it will not be able to stake its own nautical claims for fossil fuel development or even challenge the claims of others like Russia — which has staked out a region in the Arctic the size of France and Spain combined for exclusive Russian oil and natural gas development.

Smaller states with overlapping claims in the South China Sea have worked within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) political apparatus to arrive at a multilateral solution. However, the draft ASEAN "code of conduct" in the South China Sea, which seeks to settle disputes peacefully and keep the waters mostly demilitarized, was scuttled by Cambodia, the regional host for the July 2012 ASEAN meeting, at China's urging.

China understands it would lose in a multilateral environment with an array of states working against it. Thus, it prefers to deal with states (much smaller states) in bilateral settings where it can better leverage its power. That said, China realizes that it cannot bully larger states to get its way in oceanic matters.

The waters of the Arctic Ocean are largely controlled by the eight polar states: Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, the US (via Alaska) and Denmark (via Greenland). Collectively, they set policy for the region through the Arctic Council which was created in 1996 to promote cooperation and coordination of activities.

Since the opening of trans-Arctic waterways in the wake of global climate change-induced ice melt, this has suddenly become a very important body of water for states that do a lot of global shipping, as well as states that are home to petroleum exploration companies seeking to develop the vast hydrocarbon reserves that are now becoming accessible. China possesses these twin interests. But it does not possess a seat on the Arctic Council or even permanent observer status.

As an "ad-hoc observer," China must go through the humiliating process of requesting to attend each individual meeting of the Council. China very much wants to advance its status to permanent observer (like Britain, France and Germany) so it can attend all the meetings as of right and potentially participate in working groups and task forces — clearly forums that help shape access policies with respect to navigation and natural resource development. But Norway opposes China's entry on human rights grounds. A diplomatic spat occurred in the wake of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo winning the Oslo-based Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, and Beijing has not sufficiently made amends with the Norwegians — who could block China's advancement in the organization.

Unable to intimidate European states as it is able to do elsewhere, China must resolve this issue diplomatically if its more pragmatic oceanic interests are to be pursued. All of the above states are parties to UNCLOS except the US.

Since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the US has enjoyed unchallenged primacy in possessing the world's largest blue water navy.   Moreover, as half the world's shipping — worth over $5 trillion annually — passes through the South China Sea, protecting this right is paramount.    The US has not shied away from deploying this force to further its interests — including to the South China Sea — but such force projection requires freedom of navigation, a right guaranteed by UNCLOS.

It is manifestly in America's interest to ratify UNCLOS in the next session of Congress.  Republican and Democratic presidents alike have supported ratification, in addition to the Pentagon and the environmental lobby. The original hesitancy by private industry in the US of handing deep seabed mining authority over to the UN in the recovery of manganese deposits has evaporated.

The benefits of joining clearly outweigh any vague sovereignty concerns. Perhaps the biggest immediate benefit would be the ability of the US to throw the rulebook at China's feet on its oceanic claims in the same way that it can with respect to China's trading practices within the World Trade Organization — an analogously effective tool that Washington uses to help manage China's rise to great power.

Read more of Prof. Kelley's article, and in context, at the cite above.

The Pacific Way

Guambat posted a short while back about China's involvement with a economic development in the neighboring state of Yap, in the Federated States of Micronesia.  See here.  It has been reported that the plans are gobsmacking: 

As originally envisioned, the plan was to bring as many as 10,000 hotel rooms to various locations in Yap, along with golf courses, spas, restaurants and all the other amenities of an intensive visitor industry development. “The objective of this project is to develop the State of Yap into a world renowned tourism destination,”the agreement states.

The scope of the planned development is mind-boggling. ETG agrees to upgrade the airport and seaport facilities to accommodate the requirements of what will be the largest investment and development in the entire FSM, by far, since the founding of the nation. ETG will also fund the creation of a new public park and a new state capitol.

The impact of all of this on Yap is a worry. The land of stone money is the most traditional of the Micronesian states, and things haven’t really changed very much there for the past 50 years. It’s a small, tightly knit community where traditional leadership is more highly respected than the elected leadership. Although Gov. Sebastian Anefal signed the agreement on behalf of the state, he would not have been able to do so without the acquiescence of the Council of Pilung, the traditional chiefs of Yap, who were present at the signing.

Well, maybe not so fast.  There is a Pacific Way in the islands.  It values consensus over domination, dialogue and relationship stabilization over power plays, deference over challenge.  Leadership is earned through diplomacy and trust rather than brash competition.  They won't usually even look you in the eye, let alone get in your face.  They can be quite militant if pushed, but prefer a different approach, traditionally any way.

This is illustrated by the slow boil resistance to the ETG offer.  Now, it is reported in the print edition of the Marianas Variety Guam Edition, September 24th, that the Paramount Chiefs of Yap are speaking out.  Not in the adversarial way Westerners like to "debate" their differences, mind you:

The Three Pillars, Paramount chiefs of the State of Yap known as the "Dalip Pi Nguchol", have jointly signed a letter which was submitted to the whole State Leadership, in response to a fake version previously made public.

The alleged letter claimed the Dalip Pi Nguchol commanded that the ETG project be prohibited from proceeding.  The official letter issued September 21 is reported to read as follows:

"We understand that you may have received a letter allegedly from the Dalip Pi Nguchol.  As far as we know, the Dalip Pi Nguchol has neither been consulted nor contacted on any matter whatsoever.

"However, we feel that it is now of the utmost importance that, as leaders of the State Government, you come together with a unified voice in addressing the many challenges facing the State and her peoples.  No matter the challenges, this Yapese maxim will always hold true:  Ra tareb lungdad ngay ma ra fel, ma rawagey lungdad riy ma rawagey.  [Guambat only wishes he could translate that.]

"Recent events have revealed great public concerns on foreign investment.  Not all these concerns are the same, nor do they all come from the same points of view.  But they all recognize one simple truth -- that Yap State needs sustainable foreign investment.  And they all share one common underlying goal -- that foreign investments must be truly suitable for the State in terms of their sizes, types, and impacts.

"We are, therefore, requesting the State Leadership to unify and ensure that the line agencies of government will always continue to promote foreign investment, but with the underlying goal that the totality of foreign investments be sustainable and suitable for Yap, considering the size of our lands and waters, the limitations of our resources, the fragility of our environment, and the livelihood of our customs and traditions.

"This underlying goal must apply to ETG as it must to all others.  We ask that you make and keep this as a commitment to the peoples of the State.  Thank you."

 How does that compare to the bombasting and lambasting we see in our local and national governments?  Who's the more civilized?, Guambat ponders.

Samoa the same

Not exactly breaking, or braking, news this:

China a better Pacific friend than US: Samoan PM.

People's Republic of China–Samoa relations


China, and Taiwan, have been on a decades long quest to spend their way into strategic "alliances" with hands-out Pacific nation-island-states, whilst Western countries and "traditional" allies New Zealand and Australia have withdrawn support. The Pacific is dotted with many Chinese temples (of various sorts) to this buying power.



CHINA STIRS THE POT OF DIVIDED PACIFIC LOYALTIES 2006

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabou plans to appear in Fiji next month to meet delegates from Pacific Islands countries that recognise China but not Taiwan.

Pacific countries that prefer to deal with Taiwan rather than China either hadn't been invited to the meeting by the time Islands Business went to print or had decided to boycott it.

Next day, April 6, he'll have talks with the prime ministers of Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu and president of the Federated States of Micronesia. All these countries prefer to [recognize] China in return for economic aid.

They are all members of the region's political club, the Pacific Islands Forum. The countries that prefer to [give] their loyalty to Taiwan-Tuvalu, Kiribati, Palau, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Palau and the Marshall Islands are also Forum members.

This split in Forum country ranks is not the first one achieved by China as it wages its anti-Taiwan [campaign] in the Pacific Islands.

Initially, the China summit in the Pacific was heralded as the summit of Pacific leaders in the hope that heads of Forum-member governments would attend.

After hearing of Beijing's latest ploy for influence in the islands, the Taiwan Trade Mission representative in Suva, Sherman Shi-Nan Kuo objected to the involvement of the Forum Secretariat .

"Yes, we have informed the Forum that Taiwan opposes its involvement in the summit," he said. "We are a donor to the Forum and we told them that if they are organising a summit for China, then we can also ask for the same favour."

Taiwan Trade Mission's Kuo said that for 2006, Taiwan has [given] US$700,000 for the Forum Secretariat. It is also continuing with a US$500,000 scholarship scheme for island university students.

A Fiji government announcement said Jiabou's call would be a "historic" event since it would be the first meeting between China and the Pacific's islands nations.

Such Pacific Islands academics as Professor Ron Crocombe suggested that the Chinese are playing a long-term game for access to Pacific fish stocks which they already have and possible seabed mining opportunities.

In Papua New Guinea, the Chinese are moving into investment in mining and gas extraction.

The Australians have visions of the islands being taken over by Chinese organised crime and claim that drug busts, passport rackets and other criminal activities demonstrate that they're already happening.

Bertil Lintner, a journalist and an expert on organised crime, in a new book about Chinese organised crime, Blood Brothers, says China's diplomats cultivate gangs, routinely using them to spy on countries and to corrupt government politicians and bureaucrats.

President Chen Shiu Bian of Taiwan made a goodwill tour of some of Taiwan Pacific Islands friends in 2005.

The Chinese ambassador to Fiji, Cai Jinbiao, reacted with [apparent] anger in 2005 when he heard that the Taiwanese leader would overnight at Nadi and be welcomed with a Fijian welcoming ceremony by chiefs of the district.

By fronting up in Fiji, Jiabou will put it one over other major powers who for one reason or another has motives for cultivating Pacific Islanders for the few assets they have.

On May 26-27, Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, will host the fourth Japan-Pacific Islands meeting at Okinawa. Known as the PALM meeting, held every three years, it is Japan's big pitch for having good relations with the Pacific Islands.

On June 27, island leaders have been invited to be in Paris for a meeting with President Jacques Chirac, who first met them in French Polynesia two years ago.

The point of the meetings for the French is to keep Pacific leaders sweet about France's presence in the Pacific and improve relations between them and France's three Pacific territories.

In 1990, during an election trip to Hawaii, then President George Bush dropped in on a meeting of islands leaders there. His son dropped in briefly on a similar meeting in October 2003. Neither event brought anything much to the Pacific.

China has actively been cultivating relations with the Pacific Islands for more than two decades. In doing so, it has clashed often with Taiwan as the two have clawed each other for island government loyalties.

Both countries have [won] friendships with aid now totalling tens of millions of dollars.

There's hardly a Pacific Islands leader who hasn't been invited on one or more junket trips to China or Taiwan, depending on whom they back. Groups of Pacific Islands journalists are also led around in Beijing by the nose, blocked from seeing the sinister side of life in China.

The benefits gained by Taiwan from its Pacific games are the pleasure of annoying the Chinese, who are apt to turn ugly in their attempts to block switches of loyalty to Taiwan and having a voice at the United Nations.

China has cultivated Pacific Islands governments for more than 20 years. It has embassies in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia and is planning to open a consulate in French Polynesia.

It's a tussle with Taiwan over Kiribati's loyalty it lost badly two years ago when a new Kiribati government elected for a lucrative deal with Taiwan. This led to the closure of the Chinese embassy at Tarawa-although four Chinese officials continue to lurk there-and the closure of a satellite and missile tracking station it operated there.

Former Vanuatu prime minister, Serge Vohor, made a bad mistake in 2004 when after junkets to Taiwan and China he switched Vanuatu's loyalties to Taiwan without consulting his cabinet ministers. Apparently got at by Chinese diplomats, the ministers rebelled and Vohor lost office.

Nauru had fun and games with China in 2005. It used to be pro-Taiwan, which thus helped with the cost of running Air Nauru.

In July 2002, the then Nauru government decided it could get a better deal even at the cost of money for Air Nauru and switched recognition to China. Last year, the present Nauru government, deciding that Taiwan was a better deal after all, restored its recognition of Taiwan to Beijing's mortification.

Islands Business was told of an extraordinary scene at Seoul airport last year when, enroute to Taiwan, President Ludwig Scotty after leaving an aircraft, was surrounded and practically dragged off by a horde of screaming Chinese officials intent on diverting him to Beijing.

He was presented with a ticket to Beijing and offered red carpet treatment. But President Scotty headed for Taiwan instead where the carpet he trod was a deeper red.

Last month, Air Nauru announced that with Taiwan's support it soon expected to replace its sole jet aircraft seized by the United States last year for debt.

Other Chinese/Taiwan conflict was over membership of the South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO), a regional agency backed by most of the Pacific's national tourism promotion offices.

Taiwan became one of SPTO's few sources of cash. Then China moved in by joining SPTO at ministerial level-the first non-Pacific government to do so.

It blocked Taiwan's application for membership with threats, although the application was supported by pro-Taiwan members.

The Chinese made it plain that if Taiwan was admitted, then countries that hope to be put on the list of tourist destinations that Chinese tourists were allowed to visit-chiefly Fiji, Vanuatu,

Tonga, the Cook Islands and French Polynesia-would be greatly disappointed.

More reading:

China Banking on Pacific Islands 2011

As noted by Balaji Chandramohan writing for The Diplomat late last year, a number of countries including India and China are actively courting Pacific island nations as part of efforts to secure the right to station military bases there or to help develop their natural resources.

But according to the Lowy report, there has been one motivation quite specific to China, namely diplomatic competition with Taiwan. Although it notes the improved ties with the mainland since Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou took office, it quotes a Taiwanese official as stating that countries always prepare for the worst.

The danger to islands accepting these soft loans is that they are going to end up being burdened by loan repayments they can’t afford. As the report noted, Chinese loans to Tonga now make up the equivalent of 32 percent of the country's GDP, while the figure for Samoa and the Cook Islands was 16 percent. Combine this with a lack of transparency, and it’s easy to see why some Pacific island officials are concerned.

Sino-Pacific relations in the Pacific Islands

We Say: END OF THE CHINA-TAIWAN WAR IN PACIFIC?

Over the decades—and more so in recent years—there has been fierce competition between the two to win the support of Pacific Islands states with large packages of aid and a range of other financial inducements, including junkets to islands leaders.

This competition to win favours of the Pacific Islands has been described as chequebook diplomacy by the islands traditional development partners—notably New Zealand, Australia and more recently, the United States of America.

Unfortunately, many of the region’s leadership has fallen prey to these one-upmanship games between Taiwan and China and elections have been fought and governments fallen on the issue of whom to support.

Even in last month’s elections in the Marshall Islands, the question of allegiance was a major issue. Even outside the Pacific Islands region, the leaders of impoverished countries have fallen prey to this competition.

According to reports, the African nation of Malawi that supported Taiwan recently switched its support to China after it was promised a huge US$6 billion aid package.

The problem of diplomatic allegiance has caused deep schisms in the Pacific. Six Pacific Islands Forum nations—Nauru, the Solomon Islands, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu—currently support Taiwan, while the rest have followed the ‘One China Policy’, recognising the People’s Republic of China.

China and Taiwan have used the Pacific as their diplomatic battleground openly. During the annual Forum summit in Fiji in 2006, China’s assistant foreign minister publicly accused Taiwan of spreading corruption in the region with largesse.

Then again last year, Taiwan hosted a summit for its allies in Palau at the same time as the annual Forum leaders’ meet in Tonga. Several Forum leaders chose to attend the Taiwan meet—thereby upsetting some of the agenda at the Tonga meet.

Wooing the Islands: China and Taiwan High Stakes Bid for Pacific Island Support

Several Pacific Island nation governments are willing to “go with anybody” as long as it is lucrative. Selling votes at the United Nations is a common occurrence. Micronesian nations, as well as many Polynesian and Melanesian ones, regularly support virtually any resolutions proposed by the United States. Francis Hazel, director of The Micronesian Seminar, remembers how one day a television crew from Israel besieged his office in the capital of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Pohnpei. "I wondered what they were doing in this city, which hardly appears on any world maps. Then I understood: the Israeli public was curious about this country which keeps joining the U.S., voting against all UN resolutions condemning Israeli actions in the Middle East."

But China and Taiwan are the biggest players in this game. Both Taiwan and China have erected disproportionately huge buildings for use by local governments, including the parliamentary complex in Vanuatu and the government offices in Samoa. For the convention center in Majuro, Marshall Islands, where the 2nd Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit took place last October, Taiwan spent approximately $5 million.

Image Source: Wikipedia





China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus PacificPolitical Rugby



The Growing Chinese Presence in the Region

All countries' foreign relations contain some self-interest, all influence internal affairs, and all aid has strings (some visible but more hidden -- sometimes in the pockets and egos of the powerful). But in recent years in the Pacific Islands, China pursues its self-interest more forcefully, interferes more in Pacific Islands internal affairs, and has more strings on its aid than any other country.

The indigenous people of Taiwan (who were there for 6000 years before the Chinese invaded) are Austronesian, as are the ancestors of all Polynesians. In indigenous Taiwanese languages today, the word "mata" means eye as in many Polynesian languages. The Chinese people of Taiwan mostly migrated there 200 to 300 years ago and have become a different people (like the European people of USA and Australia are different from those of Europe and don't want to be recolonised by any European power). If Cook Islands leaders are happy to help crush their fellow Austronesians in Taiwan in order to gain some glory, ego massages, free trips and perks, and money to help their elections, one can understand that. But China's claim to Taiwan is simple greed for power.

China has a record of causing internal problems in Pacific countries. That is a long, sad story. Just in the last few months, President Anote Tong, of Kiribati (who is himself half-Chinese), complained of the government of China trying to destabilise his government. Then Prime Minister Saufatu Sopo'anga, of Tuvalu, lost a vote-of-no-confidence because, although Tuvalu recognises Taiwan, the prime minister was enticed by China on a secret fully-funded trip to Beijing without telling his cabinet. That caused disruption and a new election.

Aid is usually given by the richer to the poorer. But Cook Islanders are much richer (and much freer, better educated, etc), than Chinese. Income per person in the Cook Islands is much higher than in China. So why do richer Cook Islanders beg from poorer Chinese, and why is the government that controls the poor Chinese so keen to give to rich Cook Islanders instead of to its own much poorer people, many of whom are starving right now? Or to poorer people elsewhere?

It is because they figure that Cook Islands politicians are easy to manipulate and that it is the cheapest vote China can buy in the 30 or so international organisations to which the Cook Islands belongs. Although the Cook Islands is the richest Forum Island country per person in the Pacific, China has given more aid per person to the Cook Islands than to any other. It is a small step in China's strategy to dominate in the region.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific

Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West

Red line, Blue water: China has a PLAN

Chain, chain, chain, chain of fools
Five long years I thought you were my man
But I found out I'm just a link in your chain
You got me where you want me
I ain't nothing but your fool
You treated me mean oh you treated me cruel
Chain, chain, chain, chain of fools

One of these mornings the chain is gonna break
But up until then, yeah, I'm gonna take all I can take
Chain, chain, chain, chain of fools
-- Sung by Aretha Franklin

There is a lot to chew on in this post, but not all the meat you need to eat. Guambat reckons you also should read the full linked stories to get all that meat. Bon appetit!

Don't forget clean your plate. The first several items set the stage for the current stories at the end.

Full steam ahead for China's territorial ambitions by Peter Hartcher July 13, 2010

In an assertive redefinition of its place in the world, China has put the South China Sea into its "core national interest" category of non-negotiable territorial claims - in the same league as Taiwan and Tibet. China has drawn a red line down the map of Asia and defies anyone to cross it.

One-third of all commercial shipping in the world passes through the waters now claimed exclusively by China.

Why is China doing this?

Because it needs to, according to one of its top naval officials. Rear-Admiral Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, told The Straits Times: "With the expansion of the country's economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes."

China is doing it because it can, according to a retired general, Xu Guangyu. "China's long absence from its exclusive economic waters over the past decades was an abnormal historical accident and now it is just advancing to normal operations," he told the South China Morning Post. "We kept silent about territory disputes with our neighbours in the past because our navy was incapable of defending our economic zones, but now the navy is able to carry out its task."

It is one of several moves this year by Beijing to expand its naval dominion. First, it has declared a newly expansive naval doctrine. Until now, its zone of operations was limited to the so-called First Island Chain, stretching from Japan to the Philippines. But Beijing now proclaims "far-sea defence" reaching to the Second Island Chain, a zone stretching all the way to Guam, Indonesia and Australia.

The head of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard, said in April: "Of particular concern is that elements of China's military modernisation appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region."

China’s Island Chain Defense

One idea that has been on every naval strategist’s mind in recent years is the rise of China and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

The PLAN in recent years has been increasing its naval capacity, building more destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. More importantly, however, is its new tactic known as Area Anti-Access Denial (AAAD). This is the basic strategy of denying operational ability to an enemy in a specific location. China has been bolstering this capability using Anti–Surface to ship Missiles (ASM), Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), anti-satellite weapons, and advanced submarine warfare. China’s position makes it capable of denying access to any area it deems crucial to its national interest during a time of crisis.

To combat the larger operational capability of the USN, the PLAN has constructed a series of AAAD strategies focused on island chains as defensive perimeters. The first island chain runs through the Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyus Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippine archipelago. The second island chain is less distinctive, running southward from northern Japan through Guam, Micronesia, and terminating near New Guinea. Chinese strategists view these “chains” as defensive perimeters to occupy or, at the very minimum, deny an enemy access to the area they encompass.

South China Sea / "First Island Chain of Defence" - Geostrategic positions

There are two main island groups in the South China Sea: the Paracel Islands are in the northern part, about 200 miles from the coast of Vietnam and they are claimed by Vietnam as well as by China. The Spratly islands are spread through the southern part of the South China Sea and include about 100 small islets, sand bars, reefs, and rocks, comprising a total area of no more than 1.8 square miles in a vast ocean. While China claims all the Spratly islands, they are also claimed by Vietnam, which currently occupies 27 of the 100; the Philippines, which occupies 8, Malaysia which occupies 3; Taiwan which occupies 1, while China currently occupies 7 . To date, there has been no definitive international arbitration of these competing claims.

In February 1995, the Philippines revealed that one of the Spratly Islands, named Mischief Reef, which was 150 miles from its island of Pelawan, and nearly 1000 miles from mainland of China, had been occupied by China. In May 1995 the Clinton Administration privately told the Philippines not to invoke the mutual defense treaty. Instead the US urged diplomacy.... That formal pronouncement by the Department of State was ignored by China. In turn, the United States mostly ignored China’s further aggressive actions.

The effect of continuing acquiescence in these Chinese claims and actions could be to cede China de facto control over the islands in the South China Sea. China could then use the sovereign rights under international law over waters extending to twelve miles from land boundaries and the economic exclusion zone of 200 miles from the land border recognized under the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea in order to essentially establish large domains of sovereign control from the many Spratly islands and Paracel islands that might in effect give it operational or economic control over much of the South China Sea.

Such a coercive use of control over the South China Sea would be consistent with the new Chinese geopolitical doctrine of the “first island chain of defense”. This was advanced as a strategic concept in the 1990’s by General Liu Huaqing, a close associate of Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and member of the Politburo elite until his retirement in 1997. The first island chain of defense doctrine holds that to be secure China needs to control the entire region off its shores in a line from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines.

People's Liberation Navy - Offshore Defense

In 1985, the CMC approved a PLAN component of the "Active Defense" strategic guidelines known as "Offshore Defense". The PLAN also refers to this concept as the "Offshore Defense Strategy."

Operationally, "Offshore Defense" adheres to the following basic tenets of "Active Defense":

"Overall, our military strategy is defensive. We attack only after being attacked. But our operations are offensive."
"Space or time will not limit our counteroffensive."
"We will not put boundaries on the limits of our offensives."
"We will wait for the time and conditions that favor our forces when we do initiate offensive operations."
"We will focus on the opposing force's weaknesses."
"We will use our own forces to eliminate the enemy's forces"
"Offensive operations against the enemy and defensive operations for our own force protection will be conducted simultaneously"

When the "Offshore Defense" concept was first being formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and for some time after its formal adoption in 1985, the PLAN engaged in a good deal of debate and produced a good number of studies on the issue of how far offshore "Offshore Defense" should be.

As a result, with the promulgation of "Offshore Defense" in 1985, the PLAN's strategic orientation was redirected-out to sea.

Adm. Liu Huaqing was chief of the PLAN (1982-88) and later vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989-97). Liu and others defined [Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: People's Liberation Army, 2004)] the First Island Chain, or current limit of most PLAN operations, as comprising Japan and its northern and southern archipelagos (the latter disputed by China), South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Second Island Chain, which Liu envisioned as being fully within the scope of future PLAN activities, ranges from the Japanese archipelago south to the Bonin and Marshall islands, including Guam.

Initially, China would seek to be able to control over the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The three seas are all located within the "first island chain" of the Pacific Ocean, including the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands. Some Chinese analysts writing publicly include Diego Garcia, the key US military base in the Indian Ocean, as an element in the geostrategic belt enveloping China's coasts. Writing in Guofang Bao [Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang, "100,000 US Troops in the Asia-Pacific Look for 'New Homes,'" Guofang Bao, June 10, 2003, 1, FBIS-CPP20030611000068], Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang depicted the first island chain as sweeping all the way through the Indonesian archipelago to Diego Garcia in a single, unbroken arc. That is, in this conception the "first island chain" are the sea lines of communication between China and the oil fields of South West Asia.

The waterways within the "second island chain" including the Japan Sea, the Philippines Sea and Indonesia Sea, covering Kuriles, Kokkaido, and Marianas and Palau Islands in the south. To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacific waters, PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. US DOD analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggested as of 2007 that in the near term, China was seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defense that reaches out to the "second island chain" (i.e., the islands extending south and east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean). One area of apparent investment emphasis involves a combination of medium-range ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or their onshore support infrastructure. Other analysts believe that if China truly intends to expand its regional control to the "second island chain," they will have to build or acquire aircraft carriers to achieve this capability.

In the conception of Jiang Hong and Wei Yuejiang, the second island chain runs through Guam - another forward redoubt for US forces - and ends at Australia. Other analysts see Guam as in a "third island chain." Some unofficial Chinese publications refer to a "Third Island Chain" centered on America's Hawaiian bases, viewed as a "strategic rear area" for the US military.

China's 'Third Island' Strategy

Analysts have long wondered if the Chinese navy (PLAN) had a third island chain strategy, beyond the publicly declared strategies for the first island chain (centered on Taiwan) and second island chain (extending from Japan to Indonesia). Many American commentators believed that such a strategy would refer to the ability to project power capable of reaching America's bases in Hawaii.

However, China's recent maritime activities -- such as its extended counterpiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and its involvement in a number of port development projects in Indian Ocean littorals (dubbed the "string of pearls") -- have raised the suspicion in Indian defense circles that the third island chain lies in the Indian Ocean, and specifically refers to the waters surrounding the Indian Andaman and Nicobar islands.

[Shipping Lanes Map source: China: Its geostrategy and energy needs, Testimony presented to: The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission By Dr. Constantine C. Menges Senior Fellow Hudson Institute October 30, 2003]

As China's dependence on Middle Eastern energy sources has grown, so has its concern over protecting its sea lines of communication for those energy imports.

The chief and most immediate area of concern for the PLAN is the six-degree channel that lies between India's Great Nicobar Island and Indonesia's Sumatra Island, where China's shipping is especially vulnerable to Indian and other forces. Indeed, one of the key aims of India's own impressive naval build-up as well as the accretion of assets to its Andaman- and Nicobar-based tri-services command is to "surveillance seed" the Lumbok and Sunda straits as a non-lethal demonstration of Indian capabilities -- in much the same way the U.S. Navy is building up Guam. In this context, China's recent provocations and overall aggressive stance along the disputed Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas could be seen as an attempt to make India spend more on its army and air force, thereby leaving less for India's emerging blue-water navy.

US in 'denial' over China's Pacific strategy

the Pentagon seems too enamored with the doctrine of "access denial", the belief that China is intent on blocking US access to the region

"Starting from almost no live surveillance capability 10 years ago, today the PLA has likely equaled the US's ability to observe targets from space for some real-time operations," two of the institute's China researchers, Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, wrote in the analysis, as seen and reported by Reuters.

"The most immediate and strategically disquieting application is a targeting and tracking capability in support of the anti-ship ballistic missile, which could hit US carrier groups ... With space as the backbone, China will be able to expand the range of its ability to apply force while preserving its policy of not establishing foreign military bases," Reuters reported.

The impetus for the advances in monitoring systems likely derived from major embarrassments for the PLA, such as the US deployments of two carriers, the USS Nimitz and USS Kitty Hawk, to Taiwan in 1996. That affront to Chinese sovereignty is seen as a turning point in post-Cold War US-China relations and in the formation of the East Asian regional order.

The access denial theory envisions the PLA acting quickly in similar scenario to neutralize US infrastructure in the region in the event of a conflict, to prevent deployment of vastly superior US follow-on forces. By striking hard, Beijing could convince the US and its allies that the cost of entry in blood and treasure would be prohibitive, despite the gaping disparities in firepower and strength between the US and Chinese militaries.

While the Western media may be exaggerating China's technological advances, a second look at how Chinese military strategy is evolving offers further counterpoints to the access denial theory. Rather than preparing for a counterstrike, it is more likely that the PLA is sticking to its "active defense" strategy and building on "space deterrence".

The PLA can achieve this by building up a formidable reconnaissance and strike capability while adopting a new tack of using political victories and psychological warfare to chip away at the US's standing in Asia. Active Defense is said to feature "defensive operations, self-defense and striking and getting the better of the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack".

Chinese military bases are about more than just naval supplies and protecting trade routes

China will be setting up its first military base abroad in Seychelles to "seek supplies and recuperate" facilities for its navy.

The Indian Ocean island nation has defended its decision by suggesting that it has invited China to set up a military base to tackle piracy off its coast and Beijing has played it down by underlining that it is standard global practice for naval fleets to re-supply at the closest port of a nearby state during long-distance missions.

But there should be no ambiguity for the rest of the world: Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean has gotten bigger and will continue to get bigger in the coming years. Shen Dingli, an influential professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, asserted two years ago that "it is wrong for us [China] to believe that we have no right to set up bases abroad." He argues that it is not terrorism or piracy that's the real threat to China; it's the ability of other states to block China's trade routes that poses the greatest threat.

To prevent this from happening, China, according to Dingli, needs not only a blue-water navy but also "overseas military bases to cut the supply costs."

Whilst most of the stories above have been published during the last 2 years, the following are current.

China military warns of confrontation over seas

China's official Liberation Army Daily warned that recent jostling with the Philippines over disputed seas where both countries have sent ships could boil over into outright conflict, and laid much of the blame at Washington's door.

"Anyone with clear eyes saw long ago that behind these drills is reflected a mentality that will lead the South China Sea issue down a fork in the road towards military confrontation and resolution through armed force," said the commentary in the Chinese paper, which is the chief mouthpiece of the People's Liberation Army.

"Through this kind of meddling and intervention, the United States will only stir up the entire South China Sea situation towards increasing chaos, and this will inevitably have a massive impact on regional peace and stability."

"The United States' intention of trying to draw more countries into stirring up the situation in the South China Sea is being brandished to the full," said the newspaper.

Major General Luo Yuan, a retired PLA researcher well-known for his hawkish views, amplified the warnings from Beijing issued through state media.

"China has already shown enough restraint and patience over this incident," Luo said of the friction with Manila, according to an interview published on Chinese state television's website (news.cntv.cn).

If the Philippines "takes irrational actions, then the current confrontation could intensify, and the Chinese navy will certainly not stand idly by," he added.

In past patches of tension over disputed seas, hawkish Chinese military voices have also risen, only to be later reined in by the government. The same could be true this time.

US Worried As China And Russia Prepare To Hold Historic Joint Naval Exercises

China and Russia are making military history this weekend with the first bilateral naval exercises the two governments have ever conducted together.

Last August, after almost 10 years of fanfare in China and a decade of anxious observation by the U.S. and Japan, the Chinese government finally conceded that the newly painted, newly renovated warship that sat in Dalian harbor would indeed become China's ticket into the very small club of nations that have aircraft carriers.

China's aircraft carrier remains largely unmanned, and no planes have ever lifted off from or landed onto its flight deck, but observers are wondering whether that will happen during the coming sea trials. That would raise China's capabilities for sea warfare to a new level.

As for the Russian Navy's Varyag, it was built during the Cold War to target major U.S. assets in the Pacific, and it would have used its fast supersonic missiles to sink large American ships in case of a breakout of hostilities during that period.

Including a ship purpose-built to hunt U.S. carriers may lead some to think the Sino-Russian exercises are really directed at America -- and its closest ally in the region, Japan.

Over the past decade, the People's Liberation Army Navy has demonstrated that it can build large, technically complex ships, armed with advanced sensors and powerful weapons.

The U.S. Navy is particularly concerned about the combination of quiet submarines, potent anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, and modern airpower that China can now deploy against its forces in the Western Pacific. The Pentagon has noted in the past that if hostilities emerged between the two countries, China could leverage these "asymmetric capabilities" to deny the U.S. access to maritime zones in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

Meanwhile, the Chinese navy is also demonstrating that it can construct larger ships, train for more complicated missions (including humanitarian assistance), and operate farther away from home shores than ever before. China's recent deployment in an anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden includes the largest warship the country has ever constructed, a 20,000-ton amphibious-warfare ship. Last year, when China evacuated 30,000 of its citizens from Libya, it sent destroyers into the Mediterranean Sea to escort them.

As for the exercises beginning Sunday, China said they will "deepen the strategic and cooperative relationship [with Russia]." The aim of the exercises is to "improve abilities to respond together to new challenges and new threats," and "protect the Asia-Pacific region and world peace and stability." The official statement names no countries, but there is little ambiguity as to which one China means in the reference to "new challenges and new threats."

The U.S. Defense Department has crafted a new doctrine for its forces, the "Air-Sea Battle Concept," to better deploy technologically advanced naval and air forces in a comprehensive way against a well-prepared, well-defended, industrialized state opponent.

The doctrine marks a major strategic redirection away from fighting small, stateless armed groups, which was the predominant concern of the Pentagon during the past decade -- and that is a fact not lost on the Chinese.

A Chinese defense-ministry representative, Col. Geng Yansheng, called the Air-Sea Battle Concept "a manifestation of Cold War mentality." And Rear Adm. Yang Yi (ret.) called it a means to "undermine peace, stability, and prosperity" in the Asia-Pacific region. "To understanding people, it is clearly targeted at China's military modernization," said the former Chinese naval officer.

If you're still hungry or just want some desert, Guambat suggests you might want to peruse "The Maritime Strategy of China in the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Development and Impact" By PAUL AN-HAO HUANG, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, August 2009, School of Social and Political Sciences, Faculty of Arts, The University of Melbourne, link here to download pdf.

I did but see him passing by

Guambat is here talking about the inscrutable Mr. Murdoch, but with full apoplectics to poor old Sir Robert Menzies, the die hard of monarchism in Australia. Be sure to click the link in that story to hear this.

Murdoch is no Sisyphus. When that bastard chooses to climb a mountain, stone and all, he does; and he stays. Stone and all.

Or so it once was, and so it may forevermore no longer be if the story is told the way some minstrels would sing it.

Mr. Murdoch is one of those Genghis Khan types whose unbent rises to power consumes himself. For him, every slight along the way, every refusal to step aside, is not only remembered, it is crucified in both glory and gore.

When he was only 30 he had to step back and tug forelock from the ascending Kennedy star, in a move that left him with but no choice but to give up his birthright of citizenship to take on the entirety of the American political might, with control of the Wall Street Journal and Fox "News" and countless other rags for riches.

But before he consummated screwing over the sheepish American "news" followers, he first had to settle his score with the Mother Land, and the Mother of all mothers in that land.

Murdoch got his moleskins dirty following other Aussie country gentry, such as John McEwen, leader of the Australian Country Party. McEwen was governing in coalition with the larger Menzies-Holt Liberal Party. (Wikisource) "From the very first issue of The Australian Murdoch began taking McEwen's side in every issue that divided the long-serving coalition partners."

Murdoch, probably akin to McEwen, and certainly unlike Menzies, chafed at the old English establishment running Australia. So he would have been less than pleased with Menzies' sycophantic rendition of "we did but see her passing by". ("Despite Menzies continuing electoral success, Australians increasingly felt that his British and royalist sentiments were out of step with the majority attitude. This was brought to the fore in Menzies' much-lampooned 1963 speech to the Queen in which he quoted the verse "I did but see her passing by and yet I love her till I die". (Click to hear an excerpt from the speech." (From this).)

And so, before exiling himself back to Merry Old England, Murdoch, like a cat in a cat pan, scratched over Menzies' place in history by backing his nemesis, Gough Whitlam. As Wikipedia recounts, "Rupert Murdoch's flirtation with Whitlam turned out to be brief." Murdoch was, even at that early point in his empire building, more pragmatic than dogmatic, but even so, you could only push an old dog so far.

Having buried Menzies and abandoned Whitlam, Murdoch set about settling scores with Merry Old. As Wikepedia puts it: "In Britain in the 1980s Murdoch formed a close alliance with Margaret Thatcher, and The Sun credited itself with helping John Major to win an unexpected election victory in the 1992 general election.[38] However, in the general elections of 1997, 2001 and 2005, Murdoch's papers were either neutral or supported Labour under Tony Blair. This has led some critics to argue that Murdoch simply supports the incumbent parties (or those who seem most likely to win an upcoming election).

As we've seen in his framing of Fox News, Murdoch is very keen on selling media by, simply, telling folks what they want to hear, and then claiming it was his idea all along. Fair and balanced? Get real. Never give a sucker an even chance. Make him laugh, make him dance, make him pay.

And so, by wheeling an wiling, Murdoch has stitched up the world, from Adelaide to Arlington, from Sydney to Surrey, from Baltimore to Beijing. It's been a feat you just have to admire, no matter how much it makes you sick to your stomach at the same time.

But like Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Genghis and the rest, the impetuous dash for power, glory and most likely just getting even with all the rest because one slob sometime somewhere kicked sand in their faces, they burn out. Some of them go down in a flame of glory, others just go down, burned out.

Mr Murdoch is past his high corona days, but not one to be shorted unhedged.

As this item from not too long ago reported, It was Murdoch wot won it – or so he'd like us to believe.

Murdoch the Magician. Can he unwrap himself, again, from this Houdini trap?

Murdoch Defiant as FBI Acts

In an interview with The Wall Street Journal [WHICH HE OWNS] late Thursday, he said he wanted to address "some of the things that have been said in Parliament, some of which are total lies. We think it's important to absolutely establish our integrity in the eyes of the public. ...I felt that it's best just to be as transparent as possible."

Guambat has indeed but seem him, figuratively, passing by. But love him 'til he dies? Not a chance.

A good Israeli friend once told Guambat, you have to admire the Israelis, even if it is impossible to love them. Funny, Murdoch doesn't loooook Jewish.

How much runway does an aircraft carrier need?

Moscow is taking an interest in the US military's renewed interest in things Guam.

In Moscow's case, either they need some better analysts, or better interpreters. Don't know.

US to built super base on Pacific island of Guam

The USA is building an 8 billion super military base on the Island of Guam. The work is currently being done on the U.S. Air Force Base in Guam to build docks for aircraft carriers....

Naturally, Americans do not say officially that this base is being created to contain China’s military build-up. But if we look at the map and compare the military potential of the countries surrounding the Pacific Ocean, it won’t be difficult for us to understand that, most likely, China is exactly the key factor, which is taken into consideration here.

However, there’s reason to believe that China’s answer to the on-going construction will be a new increase in assignments for the development of its navy. Because the Chinese fear that U.S. domination of the northern part of the Pacific Ocean may hamper China’s efforts in the settlement of the Taiwan issue.

If we compare the military might of China and the USA, we’ll see that China has to work much to catch up with the USA, the Russian expert says. We can say nothing about China’s parity or its ability to resist the USA on the high seas either. However, the dynamism of the development of the Chinese naval forces is an object of concern for the Pentagon strategists. There’s an opinion that if this tendency remains and if the USA fails to increase considerably the budget of its naval forces, in 15 to 20 years China will pose a serious threat to the U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific Region.

There’re many American military facilities in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, Kortunov says. They are scattered over a large territory north of Alaska across Okinawa and as far as the Hawaiian Islands, where, traditionally, the U.S. Navy has a stronghold. Which means that there’re many U.S. military facilities there, which form an arc and which must guarantee America’s hegemony in the Pacific Ocean.

As Americans say, these facilities have been set up to guarantee the security of commercial communications in the region, including the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf area to the western coast of the USA. But taking into account the current tendencies, this infrastructure is regarded by many people in Beijing as one that is aimed against China.

Asked whether the new super base will infringe on Russia’s interests, the head of the New Eurasia Foundation said that, as it appears, it would be beneficial for Russia to distance itself from the current arms race.

The sun sets

The sun has finally set on the British Empire. When it comes to being a serious world power, you have to pay to play. You can't talk that talk, even with a plum in your mouth, if you can't walk that walk.

Britain's armed forces will have to seek French help to fight a war

Britain's armed forces will have to seek French help to fight a war The review all but ruled out the possibility of Britain ever mounting a major independent operation again, saying that future wars will be fought alongside allies. It said Britain must "intensify" its cooperation with France.

At the heart of the review is a new policy on military operations that limits the size of the force Britain will be able to send to the front line -- 30,000 on short-term deployment, well below the 45,000 sent into Iraq in 2003.

For "enduring operations" over several years, Britain will be able to sustain a force of only 6,500 troops. There are 10,000 British personnel in Afghanistan.

Read more: http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Britain+armed+forces+will+have+seek+French+help+fight/3698205/story.html#ixzz12tAKF6w7

U.K. slashes military budget but seeks to protect place on world stage

Instead, Britain will invest in its much admired special forces and develop expertise on cyber threats to secure the country's status as a major global power, Cameron said.

Cameron said the overhaul wasn't just aimed at cutting the military budget — saying he was breaking decisively with the strategy of predecessors Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.

He criticized the previous government's decision to sign contracts for two new aircraft carriers — explaining that cancelling the program would have cost more than building the vessels. "That is the legacy we inherited, an appalling legacy the British people have every right to be angry about," he said.

Late Monday, the British leader shared details with President Barack Obama in a phone call, hoping to assure the White House that Britain will still be equipped to fight alongside the U.S. on missions overseas.

"Britain has punched above its weight in the world, and we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come," Cameron told the House of Commons.

Lt. Gen. Graeme Lamb, a former adviser to U.S Gen. Stanley McChrystal and formerly director of Britain's special forces, said the cuts would not leave the military weakened.

"It's a bit like poker — you never get the hand you want, you get the hand you're given.

The art form is to play it well," said Lamb, whom Cameron has asked to review the use of reserve forces.

Tut, tut. Oh yes, that. Keep the stiff upper lip.

Ni hao to a Grasshopper

Lynn: Guam Plays Pivotal Role in Globally Important Region

The realignment of forces on Guam is key to maintaining an effective U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the deputy defense secretary said here today.

“We must commit our forces carefully to ensure they are effective across the widest possible range,” Lynn said. “And Guam is the linchpin in our force structure strategy in this region.

The realignment on Guam is part of a larger U.S. posture shift in Asia, Lynn explained, as forces become more “geographically dispersed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable.”

Geography alone guarantees Asia a key role in world affairs since Asia and the Pacific take up more than half of the Earth’s surface, with 43 countries and 60 percent of the world’s population, Lynn said.

“Reflecting its importance, five of the seven bilateral defense agreements the U.S. has are with nations in Asia,” he said. “Without question, the rise of Asia in economic and military terms is the most significant change in the strategic environment for the United States.”

“We need the right mix of forces to address the increasing set of security missions across the region,” William J. Lynn III told an audience of local officials and community leaders while taking part in the University of Guam’s Presidential Lecture Series.

As the westernmost U.S. territory in the Pacific, Guam is centrally positioned in a region of increasing global importance, Lynn noted. The island offers access to U.S. allies and potential hot spots throughout the region – Guam is two-to-five hours by air and two days by ship from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia and other key western Pacific locations.

“If done effectively,” Lynn said, “our work will help safeguard our fellow citizens, ensure the long-term health of Guam and bring continued stability to the entire Pacific region. And these are things we all have a stake in.”

To graphically understand the statements and statistics Undersecretary Lynn referred to, see the maps showing the relative and near proximity of Guam to neighboring countries in this Guambat post. To give a flavor of it, this map shows Guam at the center of a circle (elongated by the location slightly north of the equator) with a radius 5000 miles, which is about the distance between the US states of New York and Hawaii.




Back before computers and internet, Mr and Mrs Guambat enjoyed watching that overly fictionalized modern western show Kung Fu, with David Carridine. Carridine played a sort of Chinese Monk/Warrior on a Crusade through the western US. Guambat did say it was fictional.

Carridine's character, named Kwai Chang Caine, was a hapa-Sino man, but in the many flashbacks to his young days in the monastery, his Master called him Grasshopper, or sometimes Young Grasshopper. Guambat reckons Master Yoda's Young Skywalker name is too close in cadence and connotation to be coincidence.

Guambat is now worried that a plague of Grasshoppers may be steaming their way to his Bayview Burrow, after reading this story:

U.S.-South Korea war games raise China's hackles

China views the military exercises in the Sea of Japan as a threat to its territorial integrity. Beijing's indignation appears calibrated to push back at U.S. dominance in the
region.

"What will Americans feel if the Chinese or Russian military travel across the ocean to hold their exercises in the high seas not far from the coast of Florida, New York or California?" demanded an editorial writer in Tuesday's English-language China Daily.

China's reaction has been equally sharp regarding remarks Friday by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Hanoi suggesting that China submit to international mediation to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Global Times, which has close ties to the Communist Party, accused the United States on Wednesday of trying to "ambush China in its backyard."

"China is protesting because they now feel powerful enough to do so," said Han Suk-hee, an expert on Chinese-North Korean relations at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. "They feel more mature as a superpower, ready to manage the world, certainly the seas off their own coastline."

"The U.S. and South Korea paid attention to China's worries and changed the location of the drill," Zhou Yongsheng, a professor from China Foreign Affairs University, wrote in Oriental Outlook, a government magazine. "It is not merely because the U.S. and South Korea were trying to 'give face' to China. It has shown China's power and impact in Northeast Asia is rising."

While Guambat prefers to think, and as history has shown, Guam is the Crossroads of the Pacific, others want to portray it as the Tip of the Spear. Either way, Crossroads or Spear, with all the US military buildup taking place now and planned over the next decade, China will take notice.

Whether China sees Guam as an insignificant but strategic bit of geography or a spear pointed at its soft underside, it will take an interest that has very much potential to unsettle Guambat's nervous system.

Guambat will take Chinese lessons. Ni hao and xie-xie very much.

It was never the ISTs; it was always the ISM

What a bunch of silly gooses we are. We thought that the whole response to 9-11 and the other attacks both before and after the attacks on New York was to get the terrorists who were doing this. Bush told us he was going to get 'em, dead or alive.

But, as it is now emerging, that was never the plan, and the number of ways we have been lied to is just staggering. I suppose, if that had been the plan -- to get the guys what done us wrong -- they may have actually implemented it. There might have even been a mission accomplished by now.

After the attacks, it is fair to say the governments of the West had a bit of license to hunt down the killers and deal with them. But, under the guise of doing that, they have had something else in mind. Something that has never been openly debated in any hall of any congress. Something that is so broad, so challenging, so uncertain, so different to the ways things had been done in the past that you would think usual democratic principles would demand a debate and a specific democratically arrived at authority. It is the kind of major initiative that you think ought to emerge only after the people have been asked about it and given their approval.

What the Coalition of the Willing has had it in mind to do from the very beginning was to re-jig the very foundations of the ancient societies throughout the Middle East. The goal is to tear down all the halls of "oppression" wherever they might be and replace them with an American led "democratic" putsch. Presumeably, that would mean replacing all the Kings and Princeses and Emirates and Sultans and Mullahs and Ayatollas and other tribal leaders with duly constituted, freely and popularly elected peoples' representatives and institutions. Even, perhaps especially, the Saudis.

Because, they assert, only a democratic society can eliminate terrorism. (The corollary being, terrorism cannot exist in a democratic society -- so why are we having all these anti-democratic terror laws being enacted?)

Here it is, straight from the horse's (US Secretary of State Rice) mouth:

"But the fact of the matter is that when we were attacked on September 11, we had a choice to make. We could decide that the proximate cause was al-Qaeda and the people who flew those planes into buildings and, therefore, we would go after al-Qaeda and perhaps after the Taliban and then our work would be done and we would try to defend ourselves.

"Or we could take a bolder approach, which was to say that we had to go after the root causes of the kind of terrorism that was produced there, and that meant a different kind of Middle East [not Iraq, not Afghanistan, the whole bloody Middle East]. And there is no one who could have imagined a different kind of Middle East with Saddam Hussein still in power. I know it's difficult, but we have ahead of us the prospect, and I think the very good prospect of a foundation for a democratic and prosperous Iraq that can solve its differences by politics and compromise, that becomes an anchor for a Middle East that is changing.

"If you look at Lebanon and you look at the Palestinian territories and you look at what is going on in Egypt, this is a Middle East that is in transformation to something far better than we have experienced for the last 60 years when we thought that we could ignore democracy and get stability and, in fact, we got neither. So yes, it's long, and yes, it's hard, but if we quit now, we are not only going to condemn generations of people of the Middle East to despair, we are going to condemn generations of Americans to continued fear and insecurity....

"What we are focused on is getting the Syrian regime to change its behavior. The Syrian regime is out of step with what is going on in the region.... They are stirring up difficulties in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, which is a problem for the Palestinian territories and the work that Mahmoud Abbas is trying to do in bringing a Palestinian state to bear. And, yes, they are permitting the use of Syrian territory for terrorists to cross Syrian territory. And by the way, in many cases they're coming through Damascus airport. This isn't crawling across the border as they do in Pakistan or Afghanistan. And so, yes, they're using--that territory is being used to kill innocent Iraqis, innocent men, women and children, because suicide bombers are coming through there.
So this is about Syrian behavior...."

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9684807/

For more on ists and isms, see http://guambatstew.blogspot.com/2005/10/crusader-rabbit-and-other-hair-brained.html